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Socioeconomic Rights Adjudication in Canada: Can the Minimum
Core Help in Adjudicating the Rights to Life and Security of the
Person under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
ANIA KWADRANS*
Les manquements aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels (DES) fondamentaux
minimaux privent les personnes et les groupes les plus vulnérables de la société des
ressources nécessaires à leur vie et à leur bien-être rudimentaire. Les États ont
l’obligation d’assurer la disponibilité de recours significatifs pour de tels manquements.
Bien que l’articulation d’une obligation fondamentale minimum en matière de DES
présente certains défis, et que les critiques de ce concept croient que les tribunaux n’ont
pas la compétence institutionnelle requise pour le mettre en œuvre, il s’agit tout de même
d’un outil important pour la prise de décision. L’obligation fondamentale minimum met
l’accent sur la recherche des objectifs sous-jacents des droits de la personne : la
protection des groupes vulnérables et marginalisés contre les formes les plus graves de
dépravation et de souffrance. Elle renforce l’indivisibilité et l’interdépendance – et
conséquemment la justiciabilité – de tous les droits de la personne. Prenant à titre
d’exemples deux décisions récentes relatives aux droits à un logement adéquat et aux
soins de santé au Canada, cet article avance que l’obligation fondamentale minimum est
prometteuse. En effet, elle peut servir d’aide à l’interprétation dans l’évaluation du
contenu des droits à la vie et à la sécurité de sa personne, en vertu de l’article 7 de la
Charte, et ce, en respectant pleinement les limites institutionnelles applicables et les
obligations internationales du Canada en matière de droits de la personne.
Violations of the minimum core economic and social rights (ESR) deprive society’s
most vulnerable individuals and groups of the very resources that are essential to life and
basic well-being. States have an obligation to ensure that meaningful remedies are
available for such infringements. Though articulating a minimum core for ESR poses
challenges, and critics of the concept find it beyond the institutional competence of
courts, it remains an important tool for adjudication. The minimum core focuses the
inquiry on the underlying goals of human rights: the protection of vulnerable and
marginalized groups from the most serious forms of deprivation and suffering. It
reinforces the indivisibility and interdependence—and, consequently, the justiciability—
of all human rights. Using the examples of two recent cases considering the rights to
adequate housing and health care in Canada, this paper suggests that the minimum core
may have potential to serve as a useful interpretive aid to assess the content of rights to
life and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter, in full respect of
institutional boundaries, and in a matter that is consistent with Canada’s international
human rights obligations.
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THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING has identified
homelessness as “an extreme violation of the rights to adequate housing and non-discrimination,
and often also a violation of the rights to life, to security of the person … and to freedom from
cruel and inhuman treatment.”1 Yet, as the Special Rapporteur observes, homelessness “has not
been addressed with the urgency and priority that ought to be accorded to so widespread and
severe a violation of human rights.”2 Indeed, in 2007, Miloon Kothari, the former Special
Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, noted with alarm that,
Canada has [had] a reputation around the world for its progressive housing policies
and programmes, but that is no longer the case … Canada’s successful social housing
programme, which created more than half a million homes starting in 1973, no
longer exists. Canada has fallen behind most countries in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development in its level of investment in affordable
housing. Canada has one of the smallest social housing sectors among developed
countries.3
Despite the massive scope of the problem and its terrible impact on the lives and security of
hundreds of thousands of Canada’s most vulnerable, Canadian courts have had only one
opportunity to consider the human rights implications of Canadian governments’ failure to act to
alleviate this suffering.4 In the case of Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General),5 the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice and a majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario denied the
applicants, all poor and suffering from homelessness or inadequate housing, access to a hearing.6
By dismissing the case, on a motion brought by the respondents, as disclosing no reasonable
cause of action, the courts effectively denied at the outset the possibility that the crisis may

1

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to
an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, 31st Sess, UN Doc
A/HRC/31/54 (30 December 2015) at para 4, online: <daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/294/
52/PDF/G1529452.pdf> [Special Rapporteur on Housing].
2
UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the
right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari, 61st Sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/48 (3 March 2005),
summary, online: <daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/103/60/PDF/G0510360.pdf>.
3
As cited in Michael Shapcott, “UN to Canada: Take action on housing, homelessness!” Wellesley Institute (22
October 2007) online: Wellesley Institute <wellesleyinstitute.com/housing/un_to_canada__take_action_
on_housing__homelessness_/> [perma.cc/P8RL-Y8N5].
4
There have been at least two cases which have considered the human rights of the homeless: Victoria (City) v
Adams, 2009 BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29 [Adams] and BC/Yukon Association of Drug Survivors v Abbotsford
(City), 2014 BCSC 1817 [Abbotsford]. However, unlike Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 5410,
116 OR (3d) 574 [Tanudjaja, ONSC] and Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 852, 123 OR (3d)
161 [Tanudjaja, ONCA]—which were a direct challenge to the failure of governments in Canada to devise an
effective strategy to reduce and eliminate homelessness, and which sought a remedy requiring the governments to
take positive action to eliminate homelessness and inadequate housing—Adams and Abbotsford considered the
narrower issue of the legality of bylaws that penalize actions associated with being homeless, such as the erection of
temporary shelters in public areas.
5
Tanudjaja, ONSC and Tanudjaja, ONCA, supra note 4.
6
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied.
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engage Canada’s obligations to protect the rights to life and security of the person under section
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).7
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has stated that,
much like the right to be free from homelessness, “[h]ealth is a fundamental human right
indispensable for the exercise of other human rights.”8 Louise Arbour, former Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC) justice and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stressed that health
care is “a cornerstone of Canadian values, a way of honouring our fundamental commitment to
each other” and “a matter of obligation at law owing to a duty which goes to the core of the
protection and promotion of human dignity.”9 Yet in 2012, the federal government implemented
drastic cuts to its Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP), which had the effect of denying
necessary health care to many refugees and refugee claimants.10 When the constitutionality of the
cuts was challenged before the Federal Court of Canada (FC) in Canadian Doctors for Refugee
Care v Canada,11 despite making a factual finding that the denial of health services resulting
from the cuts to the IFHP “are causing illness, disability, and death,”12 the FC refused to find that
the rights to life and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter were engaged. The FC
held that because the government had “intentionally set out to make the lives of these
disadvantaged individuals even more difficult than they already are,”13 the targeted cuts to the
IFHP constituted cruel and unusual treatment prohibited under section 12 of the Charter.
However, the court found that the right to life, on its own, imposes no obligations on
governments to ensure access to health care necessary for life.
In both cases, poor, vulnerable, sick, and marginalized individuals were denied access to
meaningful remedies for their claims under the Charter section 7 rights to life and security of the
person based on a rigid, arbitrary, and outdated distinction between positive and negative rights
and concerns regarding justiciability that flow from that distinction. This paper aims to challenge
that position. Denying access to rights claims and remedies based on section 7 of the Charter to
individuals who are ill, disabled, and who are dying because they are denied access to necessary
shelter or health care starkly demonstrates that new judicial approaches are required to deal with
these problems and increase access to justice for those whom the government has disempowered.
This paper looks to international human rights law, and in particular the concept of
minimum core obligations, as a potential tool towards achieving this goal. It argues that the
approach of the Canadian judiciary is inconsistent with Canada’s international human rights
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
7

See Tracy Heffernan, Fay Faraday & Peter Rosenthal, “Fighting for the Right to Housing in Canada” (2015) 24 JL
& Soc Pol’y 10; Margot Young, “Charter Eviction: Litigating Out of House and Home” (2015) 24 JL & Soc Pol’y
46 [Young, “Charter Eviction”]; Yutaka Dirks, “Community Campaigns for the Right to Housing: Lessons from the
R2H Coalition of Ontario” (2015) 24 JL & Soc Pol’y 135.
8
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 4: The Right to the highest attainable standard of health,
22nd Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) at para 1 [General Comment 14].
9
Louise Arbour, “LaFontaine-Baldwin lecture ‘Freedom from want’: from charity to entitlement” (3 March 2005)
online: United Nations Human Rights <ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=3004
&LangID=E> [perma.cc/8D2G-CR56].
10
In addition, migrants had already largely been, and continue to be, excluded from accessing benefits under the
IFHP prior to the 2012 cuts.
11
Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 651, 28 Imm LR (4th) 1 [Canadian
Doctors]. An appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was withdrawn by a newly elected federal government in
December 2015.
12
Ibid at para 1049.
13
Ibid at para 10.
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(ICESCR), which not only require States Parties to progressively realize economic and social
rights (ESR), but also to guarantee a basic minimum core content of these rights. Interpreted
consistently with international human rights law, the minimum core can play an important role in
informing the interpretation of section 7 of the Charter.
This paper begins by setting out that ESR, like the right to health and housing, are
interdependent with and indivisible from all other human rights. Deprivations of housing, water,
food, or health are often issues of life or death because they constitute denials of the necessities
of life. This paper then introduces the concept of the minimum core, a presumptive legal
obligation to provide all individuals within a State Party’s territory or under its jurisdiction a
basic level of ESR. Any failure to provide minimum core entitlements must be strictly justified
by demonstrating that the State Party has endeavoured to use all resources available to satisfy
those obligations.
The minimum core has been subject to vigorous scholarly debate. Critics of the minimum
core argue that it sets out obligations in absolute and rigid terms that are not reflective of
different countries’ socioeconomic and cultural realities. Conversely, adopting relative
definitions of the minimum core to reflect those differences makes the concept impossible to
articulate in universal terms. Critics also assert that because the fulfilment of ESR entails
positive action on behalf of the state in terms of policy-making and budgetary allocations, these
matters are unsuitable for the judiciary to consider.
This paper relies on the example of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCSA),
which has explicitly considered the use of the minimum core in ESR adjudication.14 Agreeing
with the critics, the CCSA has rejected the minimum core and instead adopted a reasonableness
approach for assessing government policies on the provision of ESR. There are examples where
the CCSA’s reasonableness approach has led to the ordering of substantive entitlements.
Nevertheless, proponents of the minimum core worry that an approach to adjudication based
solely on the reasonableness test in the abstract, absent any delineation of the content or scope of
the ESR in question, runs the danger of depriving those rights of specific content and
legitimizing the continued hardship suffered by society’s most vulnerable individuals.
However, acknowledging the conceptual difficulties with the minimum core, much of the
debate has moved towards preserving some of its key features—the need to give substance to
ESR and subject governments to a higher level of scrutiny—to bolster the reasonableness
approach and to encourage defining the substantive content of ESR. Substantive reasonableness
requires courts to consider at the outset the needs and interests of the claimants. Then, courts
must determine whether those needs and interests fall within the scope of the right in question
and the weight to be accorded to them. Only against this backdrop should a government policy
be assessed.
This paper considers how substantive reasonableness and the values underlying the
minimum core may apply to the Canadian context. This paper suggests that the systematic
deprivation of health care from refugees, refugee claimants, and irregular migrants, and
widespread homelessness and inadequate housing in an affluent country such as Canada both
14

Section 1(1) of the Citation of Constitutional Laws, 2005 (Act No. 5 of 2005). The minimum core was considered
in the context of claims for the violation of the rights to housing and health under Sections 26 and 27 of the South
African Constitution. Section 26 of the Constitution provides that “Everyone has the right to have access to adequate
housing. Similarly, Section 27 guarantees to everyone the right to have access to health care services, sufficient food
and water, and social security. With regard to both sets of rights, the Constitution requires the government “take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of
this right.”
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constitute crises that trigger positive obligations to remedy those deprivations. In both cases,
Canadian courts have declined to consider these issues in light of section 7 of the Charter as
matters of the rights to life and security of the person.15 This constitutes an increasing divergence
from the norms established in international human rights law regarding the interdependence and
indivisibility—and, consequently, justiciability—of all human rights.
This paper concludes by exploring whether the minimum core and substantive
reasonableness approaches may provide courts with a useful interpretive tool to meaningfully
vindicate human rights. This paper suggests that the minimum core may assist in more clearly
determining which needs and interests are justiciable under section 7 of the Charter. It also
proposes that under section 1 of the Charter, the minimum core may invite a greater degree of
scrutiny into, and less deference towards, government budgetary choices. Further inquiry into the
concept’s applicability to Charter proportionality inquiries is warranted. Finally, this paper
suggests that incorporating a minimum core or substantive reasonableness approach may
promote democratic dialogue by giving a voice to the vulnerable and marginalized.

I. THE INTERDEPENDENCE AND INDIVISIBILITY (AND
JUSTICIABILITY) OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS
States Parties to the ICESCR16 have undertaken to “take steps … to the maximum of [their]
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the [ICESCR] by all appropriate means.”17 The historical separation of civil and
political rights, enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),18
from the ESR, set out in the ICESCR, has led to the misconception that civil and political rights
are enforceable in courts while ESR are not justiciable. Adherents of this view argue that unlike
civil and political rights, which are negative rights constituting restraints on government action,
ESR prescribe positive government action that is better left to the political realm.19 As further
evidence of this distinction between negative and positive (and justiciable and non-justiciable)
rights, they point to the fact that the ICESCR requires States Parties only to “progressively
realize” ESR; that, unlike the ICCPR,20 the ICESCR does not include the right to access to justice

15

In Tanudjaja, ONSC and Tanudjaja, ONCA, supra note 4, by determining on a preliminary motion that the claim,
including under section 7, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action because it was not justiciable; and in
Canadian Doctors, supra note 11, by finding that section 7 was not engaged by the claim.
16
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, Can TS 1976
No 46 [ICESCR]. Canada is a State Party to the ICESCR.
17
Ibid art 2.
18
19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Can TS 1976 No 47.
19
Malcolm Langford, “The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory” in Malcolm Langford, ed,
Social Right Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008) at 8.
20
Supra note 18. Part II Art. 2(3) states: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person
claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
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and an effective remedy for rights violations; and that the ICCPR contains an optional
complaints procedure while at its inception the ICESCR did not.21
This distinction between positive and negative rights has now largely been rejected by the
international community and in academic circles. The justiciability of ESR has also been
established through national constitutions that incorporate ESR as legally enforceable and
constitutionally binding.22 Further, in many contexts where ESR are not explicitly
constitutionally protected, judiciaries have affirmed the interdependence and indivisibility of all
human rights by linking ESR matters to the rights (among others) to life, security of the person,
non-discrimination, and freedom from cruel and inhuman treatment.23
Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem characterize the debate as casting “positive and
negative freedom as theatrical rivals rather than supporting actors.”24 And as the Special
Rapporteur on the right to health put it, “[t]he division between both sets of rights is artificial,
given there is no intrinsic difference between them. Both may require positive actions, are
resource-dependent and are justiciable.”25 Traditional “negative” rights require positive
government action to establish a governmental apparatus to secure these rights for individuals.26
This includes the appointment and training of public officials, monitoring mechanisms, and the
maintenance of accountability mechanisms. On the other hand, ESR also place negative duties
on governments. Absent compelling justifications, governments have a duty to refrain from
interfering with ESR-related resources that individuals already possess.27

21

Bruce Porter, “Rethinking Progressive Realization: How should it be implemented in Canada?” Background
Paper for a Presentation to the Continuing Committee of Officials on Human Rights (4 June 2015), online: Social
Rights Advocacy Centre <socialrights.ca/documents/publications/Porter%20Progressive%20Implementation.pdf>
[perma.cc/L4ZZ-8U7F].
22
E.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Portugal, Russia, South Korea, Spain, South
Africa, Venezuela.
23
In India, for example, the High Court of Delhi in Laxmi Mandal v Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital and Others,
WP(C) 8853/2008, Judgment of 4 June 2010, High Court of Delhi at para 20 stated: “The right to health [forms] an
inalienable component of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.” And the Indian Supreme Court in
Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union, (1981) 1981 AIR 746, 1981 SCR (2) 516 at para 6 stated: “The
right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely the bare necessaries
of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in
diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings.” As another example,
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has established that “[the] right to life is not only limited to the protection of life
and limbs but extends to the protection of health and strength of workers, their means of livelihood, enjoyment of
pollution free water and air, bare necessaries of life, facilities for education, development of children, maternity
benefit, free movement, maintenance and improvement of public health by creating and sustaining conditions
congenial to good health and ensuring quality of life consistent with human dignity” in Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v
Bangladesh 48 DLR (1996) 438 at para 17.
24
Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, “Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New
South African Constitution” (1992) 141 U PA L Rev 1 at 85.
25
UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health, 69th Sess, UN Doc A/69/299 (11 August 2014) at para 7.
26
Cass R Sunstein, “Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa” (2001) 11:4 Constitutional Forum
123 at 124.
27
David Bilchitz, “Socio-economic rights, economic crisis, and legal doctrine” (2014) 12:3 IJCL 710 at 714
[Bilchitz, “Socio-economic rights”]; Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and
Others (CCT 11/00) [2001] 1 SA 46 at para 34, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 [Grootboom].
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In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action28 was adopted at the World
Conference on Human Rights. The Declaration emphasized that “[a]ll human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated” and emphasized that “[t]he
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the
same footing and with the same emphasis.”29 In 1997, a group of more than 30 experts adopted
the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which
affirmed that any person or group whose ESR are violated “should have access to effective
judicial or appropriate remedies at both national and international levels” and stressed that “[t]he
fact that the full realization of most [ESR] can only be achieved progressively, which in fact also
applies to most civil and political rights, does not alter the nature of the legal obligation of States
… .”30 Finally, in 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted an optional complaints procedure
under the ICESCR, eradicating “the final vestiges of the historic distinction between the two sets
of rights.”31
In 2003, the CESCR, the treaty body tasked with clarifying the provisions of the ICESCR
and promoting and monitoring State Party compliance with the Covenant, emphasized States
Parties’ obligation under Article 2 of the ICESCR to employ “appropriate means” to realize ESR.
Based on this principle, the Committee affirmed that “whenever a Covenant right cannot be
made fully effective without some role for the judiciary, judicial remedies are necessary.” 32
While the Committee has recognized that the right to an effective remedy may not require a
judicial remedy in all cases, and that administrative remedies may suffice where they are
“accessible, affordable, timely and effective,” it has made clear that any classification of ESR as
“beyond the reach of the courts” is “incompatible with the principle that the two sets of human
rights are indivisible and interdependent” and would “drastically curtail the capacity of the courts
to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.”33
Likewise, the UN Human Rights Committee, the treaty body for the ICCPR, has linked
poverty and deprivation to a threat to the right to life, 34 and consistently found that the rights
guaranteed under the ICCPR contain positive obligations35 to ensure access to the necessities of
life, including food,36 health care,37 adequate housing,38 and amenities such as electricity, water,
and sanitation.39
28

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on
25 June 1993), online: OHCHR <ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx> [perma.cc/YP7N-ZNDD].
29
Ibid at para 5.
30
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (22–26 January 1997) at paras 8,
22, online: University of Minnesota Human Rights Library <umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html>
[perma.cc/W27K-JHRR].
31
Porter, supra note 21 at 2.
32
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of
the Covenant, 19th Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (3 December 1998) at para 9 [General Comment 9].
33
Ibid at paras 9–10.
34
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men and
Women), 68th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (29 March 2000) at para 10.
35
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), 16th Sess (30 April 1982) at
para 5.
36
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, 72nd Sess, UN Doc
CCPR/CO/72/PRK (27 August 2001) at para 16
37
UN Human Rights Committee. Ms. Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova v The Russian Federation, Communication No.
763/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997 (2002) at para 9.2; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations
on the third periodic report of Paraguay, 107th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/PRY/CO/3 (29 April 2013) at para 13;
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, 77th Sess, UN Doc

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2016

84

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 25 [2016], Art. 4

II. THE MINIMUM CORE
In establishing the obligation to progressively realize ESR, the ICESCR acknowledged that the
full realization of all ESR may not be immediately attainable by States Parties, particularly when
resource constraints are considered.40 At the same time, the CESCR worried that progressive
realization would be misinterpreted as somehow making ESR entirely aspirational:
[T]he fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen
under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all
meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the
realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring
full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase
must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the
Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the
full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal.41
The CESCR has developed a number of approaches to countering the idea that progressive
realization does not impose any immediate obligations on states. It emphasizes that states have
an obligation to take steps toward the full realization of Covenant rights which are “deliberate,
concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the
Covenant”42 and that obligations to “devise strategies and programmes for their promotion, are
not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints.” 43 States have an obligation under
article 2 of the ICESCR to “to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive
implementation” of each of the rights contained in the Covenant by developing “clearly stated
and carefully targeted policies, including the establishment of priorities which reflect the
provisions of the Covenant.”44 Ensuring non-discriminatory enjoyment of ESR is also an

CCPR/CO/77MLI (16 April 2003) at para 14; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human
Rights Committee: The Gambia, 81st Sess, UN Doc CCPR/CO/75/GMB (12 August 2004) at para 17; Human
Rights Committee, Concluding observations by the Human Rights Committee: Venezuela, 71st Sess, UN Doc
CCPR/CO/71/VEN (26 April 2001) at para 19; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Guatemala, 72nd Sess, UN Doc CCPR/CO/72/GTM (27 August 2001) at para 19; UN Human
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), 87th Sess, UN Doc
CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (14 August 2006) at para 14.
38
UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Canada, 65th Sess, UN
Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (7 April 1999) at para 12 [Canada Concluding Observations 1999].
39
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, 99th Sess, UN Doc
CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (3 September 2010) at paras 18, 24.
40
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States Parties
obligations, 5th Sess, UN Doc E/1991/23 (1991) at para 9 [General Comment 3].
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid at para 2.
43
Ibid at para 11.
44
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 1: Reporting by States parties, 3rd
Sess, UN Doc E/1989/22, annex III (1989) at para 4.
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immediate obligation under the Covenant.45 In addition, the CESCR has developed and applied
the concept of minimum core obligations for ESR.
The minimum core constitutes “minimum essential levels of each of the rights” that
States Parties are required to satisfy immediately rather than to progressively realize, including
“essential foodstuffs, essential primary health care, basic shelter and housing, or the most basic
forms of education ….”46 The minimum core serves as a basis for enforcing a basic substantive
level of ESR and for delineating immediate obligations.47 The minimum core is a presumptive
legal obligation. States Parties bear a heavy burden in justifying a failure to meet this obligation:
they must demonstrate that “every effort has been made to use all resources that are at [their]
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”48
The concept of the minimum core as a tool for the vulnerable to claim tangible, essential
resources necessary for the fulfilment of a minimally acceptable standard of life has been subject
to vigorous scholarly debate. Critics of the approach maintain that an absolute, universal
minimum core is impossible to articulate given the highly contextualized nature of
socioeconomic needs and challenges that countries face.49 Differing degrees of economic wealth
and diverse social structures among countries may result in varied conceptualizations of the
minimum core of ESR.50 Consequently, any universal conception of these rights is thought to be
“trimmed, honed, and shorn of deontological excess.”51 Critics also argue that delivering the
minimum core is impractical due to resource constraints and competing needs and interests. They
also posit that it creates obligations that are exclusively positive and thus beyond the competence
of judiciaries, undermining deliberative democracy.52
Many questions and difficulties arise when attempting to articulate the minimum core.
Should we conceptualize the essential minimum of an ESR as the necessities for mere survival or
those required to maintain human dignity and foster human flourishing?53 The minimum core’s
content will differ depending on which of these two normative foundations an advocate adopts.
45
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resources to maintain their survival,” (in David Bilchitz, “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core:
Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 at 15 [Bilchitz,
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human dignity. As stated by Nussbaum: “[t]he core idea is that of the human being as a dignified free being who
shapes his or her own life, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the world in the manner of a
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Which countries, branches of government, or organizations should be given the power to define
what substantive immediate guarantees ESR carry?54 Is the minimum core to be determined in
the abstract and therefore universally, or is it context-specific, to be determined on a case-bycase basis, such that any conceptualization of a minimum core is relative to the socioeconomic
conditions of a particular state? If the minimum core is founded in survival needs, what
relevance does the concept have to middle- and high-income countries? When facing resource
constraints, how is a state to prioritize certain ESR entitlements over others?55 For example,
should an HIV-positive person who needs retroviral medications to live be prioritized over an
individual who suffers from chronic, debilitating migraines that seriously erode her dignity and
quality of life?56 In other words, “must life always prevail over quality of life?”57 Sandra
Liebenberg explains that the difficulty with the minimum core “is that social needs are in fact
interconnected and that no clear-cut distinction exists between core and non-core needs” and that
the approach “does not reflect the fact that people may have other important needs which do not
meet the threshold for survival, but which warrant prior consideration in a constitutional order
founded on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”58
Critics also argue that the minimum core approach inappropriately infringes on the
separation of powers, and that determining the scope of the minimum core is beyond the
institutional competence of courts.59 This critique rests in the concern that in adjudicating on the
content and scope of ESR, judges “will assume greater power over setting socioeconomic policy,
which they are neither competent enough to decide nor accountable enough to administer.”60
Carol Steinberg argues that courts applying the minimum core approach and ordering the
fulfillment of a minimum content of ESR amounts to placing a “constitutional straightjacket” on
the legislature.61 Moreover, she states that the minimum core approach may even have negative
systemic effects by triggering a backlash to perceived judicial activism against democratically
determined priorities, “[forestalling] the constitutional conversation between the three branches
of government.”62
These concerns can be roughly grouped into three categories: (1) difficulties in defining
the content of the minimum core; (2) challenges in meeting a diversity of needs when under
resource constraints; and (3) concerns regarding institutional roles.63 These apprehensions led the
CCSA, which explicitly considered the application of the minimum core, to reject its use. With
respect to the right to adequate housing, the Court stated in Government of the Republic of South
Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others:64
54
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It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the progressive realization
of the right to access to adequate housing without first identifying the needs and
opportunities for the enjoyment of such a right. These will vary according to factors
such as income, unemployment, availability of land and poverty. The differences
between city and rural communities will also determine the needs and opportunities
for the enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately depend on the economic and
social history and circumstances of a country. All this illustrates the complexity of
the task of determining a minimum core obligation for the progressive realisation of
the right of access to adequate housing without having the requisite information on
the needs and the opportunities for the enjoyment of this right …. The determination
of a minimum core in the context of the “right to have access to adequate housing”
presents difficult questions. This is so because the needs in the context of adequate
housing are diverse: there are those who need land; others need both land and houses;
yet others need financial assistance. There are difficult questions relating to the
definition of the minimum core in the context of a right to have access to adequate
housing, in particular whether the minimum core obligation should be defined
generally or with regard to specific groups of people.65
The CCSA held that questions of socioeconomic policy are primarily a matter for the
legislature and the executive, and so in any ESR challenge, rather than considering the
content of the rights in question, the court will examine “whether the legislative and other
measures taken by the state are reasonable.” 66 The CCSA elaborated that the reasonableness
standard will not require courts to consider whether “other more desirable or favourable
measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent,”
because “a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its
obligations” which would all satisfy the reasonableness test.67
The CCSA developed a set of criteria for assessing whether a government programme or
policy is reasonable. The CESCR subsequently adopted these criteria as the test to be used
in the ICESCR’s optional complaints mechanisms.68 Consequently, these criteria became
integrated into international human rights law. The reasonableness factors include:
(a) The extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and targeted
toward the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights;
(b) Whether the State party exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory and nonarbitrary manner;
(c) Whether the State party’s decision (not) to allocate available resources was in
accordance with international human rights standards;
(d) Where several policy options are available, whether the State party adopted the
option that least restricts Covenant rights;
65
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(e) The time frame in which the steps were taken;
(f) Whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of disadvantaged
and marginalized individuals or groups and, whether they were non-discriminatory,
and whether they prioritized grave situations of risk.69
Given the difficulties of the minimum core approach, reasonableness is often perceived as a
more accommodating option for adjudicating ESR. As noted by Liebenberg, the reasonableness
approach provides courts “with a flexible and context-sensitive basis for evaluating socioeconomic rights claims” by allowing “government the space to design and formulate appropriate
policies to meet its socio-economic rights obligations.”70 Meanwhile, reasonableness mandates
continued scrutiny of government policies to ensure that they adhere to the requirement of
inclusiveness and prioritize relief to the most vulnerable and marginalized in society.71
The requirement to prioritize individuals and groups whose needs are the most urgent is
seen in particular to set a threshold requirement that gives ESR substantive content. And indeed,
in some cases the reasonableness approach has led the CCSA to order the provision of specific
necessary goods and services, such as antiretroviral medication to prevent mother-to-child HIV
transmission,72 and social assistance to permanent residents in South Africa.73
Nevertheless, some scholars remain concerned that even in these successful cases, the
court focused only on the reasonableness of the government action while avoiding giving content
and scope to the ESR in question. In Liebenberg’s view, because the reasonableness approach
does not begin “with a principled focus on the content and scope of the right and situation of the
claimants,” it relieves states of having to provide justifications for rights infringements.74
Similarly, Stuart Wilson and Jackie Dugard argue that applying the reasonableness test in the
abstract of any understanding of the interests and needs in question,
[undercuts] the court’s ability to engage head on with the claimants’ needs and lived
experiences of poverty. Instead, the Court tends to prefer a facial examination of
state policy, implicitly accepting the conceptions of reasonableness and possibility
upon which those policies are drafted and implemented. This tends to reproduce the
exclusion from policy formulation and implementation processes which have brought
the claimants to court in the first place.75
Thus, the reasonableness approach has been criticized for potentially fostering the problem
that originally concerned the CESCR with respect to progressive realization: the danger that
ESR will be deprived of any meaningful content and enable the continued suffering of the
69
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most vulnerable and marginalized. David Bilchitz argues that the minimum core is necessary
to clarify precise state obligations in relation to ESR: “The current system of invoking the
amorphous notion of reasonableness does not provide a clear and principled basis for the
evaluation of the state’s conduct by judges or other branches of government in future cases.”76
Marius Pieterse contends that rejecting the minimum core results in “the ‘dumbing down’ of
the content of social rights, which seem … to boil down to only a general expectation on the
state to act reasonably in its attempts to realize these rights.”77 He adds that the
reasonableness standard fails to acknowledge and prioritize the hardship ESR claimants face,
and that this approach is thus ineffective at correcting “the diminution of human dignity
suffered as a result of such hardship.”78
Indeed, as Kameshni Pillay observes, these concerns manifested in the aftermath of
the Grootboom decision. In a study of the implementation of the CCSA’s judgment two years
later, Pillay found that community members did not experience any significant improvements
in their daily lives. They still lived with rudimentary housing built so densely that there was a
constant threat of fires erupting, and with inadequate sanitation that led to flooding and
illness.79 The same problem of translating rights into concrete, tangible entitlements also
presented itself in the CCSA’s subsequent case of Mazibuko and Others v City of
Johannesburg and Others.80 The claimants, all from very poor households, argued that the
city of Johannesburg’s policy of limiting the supply of free basic water and conditioning
water supply on the installation of pre-payment water meters violated their right to water. The
policy created conditions where the supply of water was insufficient to satisfy their daily
requirements, as they could not afford to pre-pay for water beyond the allocated free amount.
The CCSA held that the water policy was reasonable: “the City is not under a constitutional
obligation to provide any particular amount of free water to citizens per month. It is under a
duty to take reasonable measures progressively to realize the achievement of the right.”81 In
coming to this conclusion, the CCSA would not consider evidence regarding the daily
hardships the claimants experienced and what constituted “sufficient water.”82
Refusing to ascribe substantive content to ESR creates the danger that ESR
adjudication will sideline “the very interests that prompted the inclusion of justiciable
socioeconomic rights”83 and cause the “institutional containment and suppression of the needs
[ESR] represent.”84 To reject the minimum core altogether in favour of an approach based
solely on examining the reasonableness of state actions in the abstract risks creating the very
danger that the CESCR sought to avoid: that the obligation to progressively realize rights will
be misconstrued to deprive ESR of meaningful content and legitimize the deprivation of
vulnerable and marginalized groups.
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III. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS
In order to preserve the benefits of the reasonableness approach—its flexibility, contextsensitivity, openness, and facilitation of greater participation and deliberation in defining the
scope of ESR—while also countering the dangers that such an approach may deprive the ESR of
meaningful content and legitimize continued deprivation, scholars like Liebenberg have
advocated for a “substantive reasonableness” approach. Substantive reasonableness preserves
“the features of the minimum core approach that require heightened scrutiny of acts and
omissions which result in a denial of basic needs.”85 This approach relies on the minimum core
and the values underlying it—the “desire to protect vulnerable people from serious social and
economic threats to their survival, health, and basic functioning of society”86—to promote the
development of normative content to ESR during adjudication employing the reasonableness
test. Liebenberg argues that,
until some understanding is developed … of the content of the right, the assessment
of whether the measures adopted by the state are reasonably capable of facilitating its
realization takes place in a normative vacuum. Reasonableness review should thus be
developed in a way which incorporates a principled and substantive interpretation of
the content of socio-economic rights. Such an interpretation should seek to elucidate
the purposes and interests which these rights protect ….87
Following Liebenberg’s proposal for substantive reasonableness, Wilson and Dugard suggest
that any ESR analysis must start with identifying the needs and interests the litigants have come
forth to claim. The next step is to determine whether those interests fall within the scope of the
ESR in question and, if so, to assess the weight they ought to be accorded. Only then should the
reasonableness of the government’s actions be assessed in light of this context.88 When the issues
at hand deal with basic necessities of life and well-being, the minimum core approach of
heightening the burden of justification and lowering the degree of deference owed to the state
can be incorporated into the analysis of whether the government’s actions were reasonable. But
this is only possible when a preliminary identification of the interests and needs in question, and
an assessment of whether they fall within the scope of a right and of the weight they should be
accorded, is undertaken.89
Katharine Young suggests that using the minimum core to inform the reasonableness
approach requires discarding “the goals of fixture, closure, and determinacy structured in the
concept by its advocates.”90 Similarly, Liebenberg adds that the minimum core can be useful if
we abandon its goal of universality in favour of a context-specific, case-by-case analysis of
whether the State must furnish goods or resources to particular claimants.91
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There remains a great deal of room for courts to articulate substantive content to ESR
without overstepping their institutional boundaries. While the CCSA rejected the minimum core
as a “self-standing right conferred to everyone,” it did indicate that the minimum core could
possibly be relevant to the reasonableness analysis.92 As Bilchitz points out, the minimum core
“does not represent any particular means by which a socio-economic right can be realized;
rather, it represents the standard of socioeconomic provision necessary to meet people’s basic
needs,”93 leaving governments to choose among a number of policy options to fulfill that
standard. Unlike the CCSA, the Colombian Constitutional Court adheres to the minimum core
approach and has engaged the concept in a range of ESR cases. The Court has not shied away
from ordering concrete, substantive remedies and structural injunctions, or from retaining
supervision over the implementation of the remedy in order to facilitate dialogue between the
legislature and stakeholders in fashioning a response that is consistent with constitutional
standards.94
In Canada, scholars have argued that the constitutional structure and the range of
remedial options open to judges allow courts to issue judgments that leave space for the
legislature to consider various options and respond in a manner consistent with its broader policy
objectives. They argue that this promotes a “judicial dialogue” with other branches of
government that is democracy-promoting rather than anti-democratic.95 Further, the exercise of
judicial review promotes democracy in allowing aggrieved minorities whose interests are
traditionally overlooked in the legislative process to have a voice in the democratic debate.96
Courts should “be alert to the ways in which the denial of access to the particular right
creates or reinforces patterns of inequality and marginalisation in society.”97 As the minimum
core addresses some of the direst aspects of socioeconomic deprivation, a higher level of judicial
scrutiny under the reasonableness approach is warranted.98 As suggested above, courts can give
ESR concrete, substantive content without unduly infringing on the powers of the legislature if
the process facilitates dialogue and participation. The consequences of failing to do so can be
severe. As stated by Liebenberg, “[w]ithout a recognition of this basic standard, the enjoyment of
92

Treatment Action Campaign, supra note 722 at 34.
David Bilchitz, “Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its Importance” (2002) 119 SALJ
484 at 488.
94
See Joie Chowdhury, “Judicial Adherence to a Minimum Core Approach to Socio-Economic Rights—A
Comparative Perspective” (2009) Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Paper, Paper
27; César Rodríguez-Garavito, “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights
in Latin America” (2011) 89:7 Tex L Rev 1669.
95
Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue: Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All) (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 76; Peter W Hogg, Allison A
Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited—or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors’” (2007) 45
Osgoode Hall LJ 1; Andrew Petter, “Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue
Isn’t Such a Good Thing After All)”(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 147; Kent Roach, “ Dialogic Judicial Review and its
Critics” (2004) 23 SCLR (2d) 49; Kent Roach, “Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues About
Rights: The Canadian Experience” (2005) 40 Tex Int’l LJ 537. In other jurisdictions, see e.g., CRG Murray, “The
Continuation of Politics, by other means: Judicial Dialogue under the Human Rights Act 1998” in Roger Masterman
& Ian Leigh, eds, The United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 94.
96
Kent Roach, “Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 169
at 172.
97
Liebenberg, “Socio-Economic Rights,” supra note 52 at 328.
98
Benjamin Oliver Powers, “The ‘Reasonableness’ of Poverty: Progress and Pitfalls in South Africa’s Socioeconomic Jurisprudence” (2014) Senior Projects Spring 2014, Paper 3.
93

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2016

92

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 25 [2016], Art. 4

all other rights is imperilled and the foundational constitutional values of human dignity, equality
and freedom will … ‘have a hollow ring.’”99

IV. CRISIS IN CANADA
Critics of the minimum core suggest that because minimum core obligations aim to prevent
deprivation of the most basic resources necessary for life, the concept has no application to highincome countries where most individuals experience a higher standard of living. Bilchitz,
however, compellingly argues that the minimum core approach remains relevant even to
countries like Canada when they are dealing with situations of crisis. Bilchitz describes two
forms of crisis: personal and structural. A personal crisis exists when “individuals are in
desperate circumstances and lack the ability to meet the very general necessary conditions for
being free from threats to their survival or basic well-being.”100 A structural crisis forms when
there are many individuals suffering from personal crises, and “the causes of the situation are
themselves connected with one or more social or economic system or structure. Any solution to
the circumstances in question requires addressing the more general structural features that have
given rise to the problem.”101 Bilchitz argues that “times of personal crisis are … the very
conditions under which the general obligations flowing from [ESR] have the greatest importance
and the positive obligations, in particular, become activated.”102 This is true regardless of the
broader socio-economic conditions of any particular state. Canada faces at least two significant
crises that trigger the obligation of positive action: the deprivation of health care from refugees
and irregular migrants, and the critical situation of homelessness across the country.103

A. CUTS TO REFUGEE HEALTH CARE
In 2012, the federal government made significant cuts to Canada’s IFHP which had, for five
decades prior, provided comprehensive health insurance coverage for refugees and refugee
claimants. The pre-2012 IFHP provided health care benefits for medical care of an urgent or
essential nature, emergency dental conditions, immunizations, preventative medical care,
99
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contraception, dental and vision care, essential prescription medications, prenatal and obstetrical
care, and immigration medical examinations. These benefits were provided to all individuals
under the administrative control of Canada’s immigration authorities, whether they were
refugees, refugee claimants, failed refugee claimants, individuals entitled only to a Pre-Removal
Risk Assessment (PRRA),104 victims of human trafficking, or immigration detainees. Coverage
was available until such persons either became eligible to receive provincial or territorial health
insurance, or left the country.105 Irregular migrants106 were not covered by the IFHP and not
entitled to health care in Canada.107
The 2012 changes were instituted by way of two Orders-in-Council by the Governor in
Council, resulting in a new, tiered system of health benefits to persons in need of protection in
Canada: Expanded Health Care Coverage (EHCC),108 Health Care Coverage (HCC)109 and
Public Health or Public Safety Health Care Coverage (PHPS).110 The tier a person will be
104
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refugees, victims of human trafficking, and some individuals admitted under a public policy or on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds.
109
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insurance benefits received by working Canadians through their provincial or territorial health insurance plans, with
the proviso that services and products are only covered “if they are of an urgent or essential nature” as defined in the
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only if their health problems are of an urgent or essential nature. HCC benefits do not include routine primary health
care services such as annual check-ups, preventative health care, and standard screening tests, and the costs of most
prescription medications. Those entitled to HCC benefits include refugee claimants from non-DCO countries,
recognized refugees, successful PRRA applicants, most privately sponsored refugees, and all refugee claimants
whose claims were filed before 15 December 2012, regardless of their country of origin.
110
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entitled to under the 2012 IFHP depends on a number of factors, including (a) the stage of the
refugee determination process an individual finds him/herself in; (b) whether the individual is
from a Designated Country of Origin (DCO);111 (c) if the individual is not a refugee claimant, the
person’s status in Canada (e.g., permanent resident, resettled refugee, victim of human
trafficking, person with a positive PRRA decision); (d) whether the individual receives federallyfunded resettlement assistance; and (e) whether the individual is being detained.112
The cuts made to the IFHP in 2012 resulted in all refugees other than governmentsponsored refugees losing coverage for medications, vision, and dental care. Refugees from
DCOs lost all health coverage, including for urgent and essential care, except for conditions that
posed a threat to public health and security.113 Refugees entitled only to a PRRA lost coverage
even for conditions threatening public health and security. The cuts were widely decried by
medical practitioners, refugee and human rights advocates, and other prominent Canadians.114
To use Bilchitz’s terminology, the 2012 cuts to the IFHP can be described as a structural
crisis that triggers Canada’s positive obligations to protect the ESR of people deprived of
necessary health care. Such a crisis would normally engage the Canadian government’s positive
obligations to act immediately and ensure necessary health care to a particularly vulnerable and
marginalized group.115 However, where the government itself is actively causing such a crisis,
individuals deprived of necessary health care should be able to claim remedies for the violation
of their right to necessary health care before Canadian courts.

rights violations. It also includes those who fail to file their refugee claims in a timely manner and those who have
previously made an unsuccessful refugee claim.
111
Section 109.1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, allows the Minister to designate
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[perma.cc/4BT7-CBF2].
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Indeed, the new federal government, elected in October 2015, withdrew the government’s appeal of the FC’s
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The constitutionality of the Orders-in-Council was challenged before the Federal Court of
Canada in Canadian Doctors. In that case, the FC made a factual finding that the denial of health
services resulting from the cuts to the IFHP “are causing illness, disability, and death,”116
evoking the desperate circumstances of individuals being unable to meet their basic needs for
survival and basic well-being. Consequently, the FC found that the cuts constituted cruel and
unusual treatment in violation of section 12 of the Charter. The court also held that the
differential treatment of refugees from DCOs under the Program was discriminatory and violated
section 15 of the Charter. However, the FC rejected the applicants’ argument that the cuts to the
IFHP discriminated against refugees and refugee claimants on the basis of their immigration
status, re-affirming the decision in Toussaint117 that “immigration status” does not constitute an
analogous ground under section 15.118
However, despite acknowledging that “the fact that a particular claim may involve a
request that the government spend money in a particular way is not necessarily fatal to the
claim,”119 the court refused to find that the rights to life and security of the person were engaged,
stating that section 7 does not confer a “free-standing constitutional right to state-funded health
care ….”120 In doing so, the FC reinforced the same false dichotomy between positive and
negative rights that it purported to reject by distinguishing precedents from the circumstances in
Canadian Doctors: Chaoulli v Quebec121 was different because “the Supreme Court was not
asked … to require that the Province of Quebec fund specific health services for the applicants”
but rather to strike down the prohibition on Quebec residents spending their own money to
access private health care.122 With respect to Canada v PHS Community Services Society,123 the
FC found that there is “a world of difference between requiring the state to grant an exemption
that would allow a health care provider to provide medical services funded by others and
requiring the state itself to fund medical care.”124 Citing Flora v Ontario Health Insurance
Plan,125 the court noted that “there is nothing in the 2012 IFHP that limits the ability of those
seeking the protection of Canada to spend their own money to obtain health care” while at the
same time recognizing that “the right of those affected to pay for their own medical treatment
will be a largely illusory one.”126
Reducing a right to a right to pay for a right runs contrary to the very essence of universal
human rights, including the right to health care. While the FC acknowledged that “Conventions
116
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to which Canada is a signatory are relevant as interpretive guides in a Charter analysis and they
will thus be taken into account for that purpose,” no international human rights principles were
considered in the section 7 analysis.127 Moreover, the respondents’ (inaccurate, as this paper
argues) submissions “that there is no right in Canada to health care based on international law,
[and] that the scope of the international legal right to health is contested” remained
unaddressed.128

B. HOMELESSNESS AND INADEQUATE HOUSING
In Canada, homelessness can and has been described as a serious and ongoing structural crisis.129
Steady withdrawal of investments in affordable housing and social assistance by the federal and
provincial governments since the beginning of the 1980s has created a crisis where over 235,000
Canadians experience homelessness each year, with 35,000 experiencing homelessness on any
given night.130 Enduring homelessness during harsh winters has particularly devastating effects,
prompting the UN Human Rights Committee to express concern that “homelessness in Canada
has led to serious health problems and even to death” and to urge Canada to “take positive
measures required by article 6 [the right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights] to address this serious problem.”131 In 2010, precarious housing and
homelessness remained “a deep and persistent problem in Canada.”132
In 2009, the British Columbia Court of Appeal acknowledged the issue of homelessness
in Victoria as a situation that engages and applies the “most lofty of guaranteed human rights—
the rights to life, liberty and security of the person—to the needs of some of the most vulnerable
members of our society for one of the most basic of human needs, shelter.”133 Most recently, in
the October 2015 judgment Abbotsford,134 although the Supreme Court of British Columbia
found that bylaws prohibiting the erection of temporary shelters violated section 7 of the
Charter, the conclusion was reached on the basis of protecting individual autonomy to make
fundamental personal choices. The court held, problematically, that “the right to obtain the basic
necessities of life is [not] a foundational principle underlying the guarantees of s. 7.”135
In Tanudjaja, a number of applicants brought a Charter challenge against the federal and
Ontario governments, arguing that their actions and omissions in addressing the crisis of
homelessness and inadequate housing violated their rights to life, security of the person, and
equality. The claim was based on the fact that the governments’ failure to address homelessness
through an effective strategy resulted in the most serious deprivations among the most
disadvantaged and marginalized groups, stating: “Canada and Ontario have either taken no
127
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measures, and/or have taken inadequate measures, to address the impact of [policy] changes on
groups most vulnerable to, and at risk of, becoming homeless.” In failing to act, the applicants
argued that the governments “have created and sustained conditions which lead to, support and
sustain homelessness and inadequate housing.”136 The Notice of Application underscored that
“[h]ousing is a necessity of life” and that international human rights law imposes on the federal
and provincial governments the positive obligation to “take reasonable and effective measures to
ensure the realization of the right to adequate housing.”137 The applicants emphasized the impact
these policy choices have had on the lived realities of homeless people and the inadequately
housed, leading to “reduced life expectancy, hunger, increased and significant damage to
physical, mental and emotional health and, in some cases, death,” with disproportionate impacts
on women, people with disabilities, Aboriginal people, refugees and migrants, racialized
communities, seniors, and youth.138
The applicants sought a declaration that the failure to adopt a strategy to address
homelessness violated their rights to life and security of the person under section 7 of the
Charter; that the failure to address the needs of groups disproportionately affected by
homelessness by adopting a strategy targeting the needs of the most disadvantaged groups
violated the right to equality under section 15; and that Canada and Ontario have obligations
under the Charter to “implement effective national and provincial strategies to reduce and
eventually eliminate homelessness and inadequate housing.”139 The applicants also sought an
order requiring the governments to implement a strategy to address homelessness “developed in
consultation with affected groups” and including “timetables, reporting and monitoring regimes,
outcome measurements and complaints mechanisms.”140 The applicants also asked that the court
remain seized of supervisory jurisdiction in order to receive reports on the implementation of the
remedial measures ordered.141
The applicants’ arguments addressed the failures of governments to meet any of the
requirements the CESCR has found to be of immediate application—ensuring at a minimum
essential levels or the core content of the right, ensuring the non-discriminatory enjoyment of the
right, and adopting clearly targeted strategies for the full realization of the right over time. The
claim highlighted the systemic nature of the widespread personal crises that must be addressed
by the governments in order to alleviate the hardship suffered. In such circumstances, Canada’s
positive obligations to relieve the deprivation are triggered under international human rights law.
However, in response to the Notice of Application, the respondents successfully brought
a preliminary motion before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to strike the case out on the
basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The Ontario Superior Court dismissed the
136
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claim, holding that the applicants failed to point to a concrete government decision or action that
engaged Charter scrutiny, that “[t]here is no positive obligation on Canada or Ontario to act to
reduce homelessness and there are no special circumstances that suggest that such an obligation
be imposed in this case,”142 and that “what the applicants seek would require the court to cross
the institutional boundary and enter into the area preserved for the Legislature.” 143 The Court of
Appeal for Ontario upheld the Superior Court’s dismissal of the claim, finding that the claim was
not justiciable because “there is no sufficient legal component to engage the decision-making
capacity of the courts,”144 that “the absence of any impugned law” does not permit analysis under
section 1 of the Charter,145 and that “there is no judicially discoverable and manageable standard
for assessing in general whether housing policy is adequate or whether insufficient priority has
been given in general to the needs of the homeless.”146 With respect to its institutional capacity
to hear the case, the Court of Appeal stated:
This is not a question that can be resolved by application of law, but rather it engages
the accountability of legislatures. Issues of broad economic policy and priorities are
unsuited to judicial review. Here the court is not asked to engage in a “court-like”
function but rather to embark on a course more resembling a public inquiry into the
adequacy of housing policy …. Were the court to confine its remedy to a bare
declaration that a government was required to develop a housing policy, that would
be so devoid of content as to be effectively meaningless. To embark, as asked, on
judicial supervision of the adequacy of housing policy developed by Canada and
Ontario takes the court well beyond the limits of its institutional capacity.147
In dismissing the case, the Court of Appeal for Ontario denied the claimants an opportunity to
present evidence of their lived experiences of deprivation, their interests, and their needs,
which had been compiled in a record of 16 volumes, close to 10,000 pages in length,
containing 19 affidavits of which 13 were expert affidavits.148 Feldman JA, dissenting, stated
that the motion judge’s most significant error was to strike the claim without allowing an
assessment of this voluminous evidentiary record: “It is premature and not within the intent of
Gosselin to decide there are no ‘special circumstances’ in such a serious case, at the pleadings
stage.”149 Feldman JA also stressed that motions to strike “should not be used … as a tool to
frustrate potential developments in the law”150 since the question of whether section 7 of the
Charter imposes positive obligations on governments remains an open one.151
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C. REINFORCING THE INTERDEPENDENCE AND INDIVISIBILITY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA
Liebenberg and Young suggest that an approach that fails to give content to and delineate the
scope of ESR “may lead to unpredictable and potentially arbitrary judicial interventions.”152 This
has certainly been the case in Canadian ESR jurisprudence, particularly in relation to section 7 of
the Charter. In Gosselin v Quebec, the SCC considered the 1984 social assistance scheme
implemented by the Quebec government that excluded citizens under 30 from receiving full
social security benefits. While it did not find a violation of section 7 of the Charter, the Court
“left open the possibility that a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty, or security of the person
may be made out in special circumstances.”153 In 2011, the SCC found that the government’s
refusal to exempt Insite, a supervised drug injection site, from the operation of the Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act violated section 7 of the Charter because it prevented injection drug
users from accessing necessary health services, putting their lives in danger.154 That same year,
the Federal Court of Appeal held that the denial of access to the IFHP for irregular migrants
engaged the right to life under section 7 of the Charter, but that the denial was consistent with
the principles of fundamental justice.155 Yet, in Canadian Doctors, the FC refused to find that the
section 7 Charter right to life was engaged at all by the 2012 cuts to the IFHP.156
While courts in British Columbia held in 2009 and 2015 that the prohibition against
temporary overnight shelters for the homeless violated section 7 of the Charter, in Tanudjaja the
Court of Appeal for Ontario refused the homeless a hearing altogether. And despite the Court’s
reluctance in Tanudjaja to venture into questions of policy and resource allocation, the SCC had
no trouble, after finding a violation of the Charter section 15 right to equality in Eldridge v
British Columbia, with ordering hospitals in British Columbia to provide sign language
interpretation services when necessary in the delivery of health services. 157 As the FC observed
in Canadian Doctors, “Courts have been far less reluctant to impose positive obligations on
governments in order to ensure substantive equality.”158
Moreover, in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia, the SCC upheld a structural injunction
imposed by the trial judge for Nova Scotia to construct French-language schools in order to
preserve residents’ section 23 minority education rights under the Charter.159 The order included
continued court supervision over the implementation of the remedy, requiring the government to
provide the court with periodic progress reports. The Court stated:
The power of courts to issue injunctions against the executive is central to s. 24(1) of
the Charter which envisions more than declarations of rights. Courts do take actions
to ensure that rights are enforced, and not merely declared …. Section 24(1) of the
Charter requires that courts issue effective, responsive remedies that guarantee full
and meaningful protection of Charter rights and freedoms. The meaningful
152
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protection of Charter rights, and in particular the enforcement of s. 23 rights, may in
some cases require the introduction of novel remedies.160
The more recent ESR cases dealing with the right to life demonstrate that Canada lags
behind the international community in recognizing the indivisibility and interdependence of all
human rights. At least on the international stage, Canada has maintained that the Charter is the
primary vehicle by which it fulfills its international human rights obligations, and that section 7
of the Charter protects everyone in Canada against deprivations of the basic necessities of life.161
For example, Canada has stated that the right to life “requires Canada to take the necessary
legislative measures to protect the right to life [which] may relate to the protection of the health
and social well-being of individuals.”162 Yet, this has clearly not born out in Canadian courts. In
its Concluding Observations on Canada in March 2016 the CESCR criticized Canada for failing
to ensure the justiciability of ESR in domestic courts and access to remedies for
disproportionately disadvantaged and marginalized groups, including homeless persons. The
Committee recommended that Canada broaden “the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, notably sections 7, 12 and 15, to include economic social and cultural
rights, and thus ensure the justiciability of Covenant rights.”163 The Special Rapporteur on
adequate housing has also stressed that the judiciary of a State Party to the ICESCR “must
develop its capacity and commitment to adjudicating [homelessness] claims, including where the
claims seek a remedy requiring positive measures.”164 In its March 2016 observations the
CESCR also took Canada to task for withholding health care from undocumented migrants, and
recommended that Canada “ensure access to the Interim Federal Health Program without
discrimination based on immigration status.”165 So too, in July 2015, the Human Rights
Committee recommended that Canada ensure, as a requirement under the ICCPR, that all refugee
claimants and migrants in Canada have access to essential health care.166 The CESCR has
warned that States Parties who maintain arbitrary and rigid distinctions between “positive” and
“negative” rights significantly impede the capacity of courts to protect those who are most
vulnerable and marginalized.167 The SCC has established that Canadian law must develop
consistently with international human rights law and, absent express indications to the contrary,
should be presumed to conform with international human rights standards.168 As such, Canadian
160
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courts remain an important (but by no means the sole169) avenue for the vulnerable to obtain
meaningful redress for the violation of their human rights and access to substantive entitlements.
As a State Party to international human rights treaties, Canada must get over this justiciability
barrier and Canadian courts must ensure access to justice and meaningful remedies for the
infringement of all human rights under the Charter. As the CESCR has stated:
A state party seeking to justify its failure to provide any domestic legal remedies for
violations of economic, social and cultural rights would need to show either that such
remedies are not ‘appropriate means’ within the terms of article 2.1 of the Covenant
or that, in view of the other means used, they are unnecessary. It will be difficult to
show this and the Committee considers that, in many cases, the other “means” used
could be rendered ineffective if they are not reinforced or complemented by judicial
remedies.170

V. APPLICABILITY OF THE MINIMUM CORE TO CANADA
Might the concept of the minimum core or substantive reasonableness be productively brought to
bear on the interpretation and application of section 7 of the Charter? The above analysis of the
concept suggests that the minimum core approach may provide an interpretive aid in assisting
Canadian courts to bring Canada into compliance with its international human rights obligations
by shifting the focus of the inquiry to the values underpinning the minimum core and ESR
generally: the protection of vulnerable and marginalized groups from the most serious forms of
deprivation and human suffering. As the substantive reasonableness approach suggests, the
starting point in any inquiry should be the interests and needs of the claimants as experienced
through their lived realities, then a determination of whether those needs and interests fall within
the scope of the right in question and the weight that should be accorded to them. Only then
ought a state policy be assessed in terms of its reasonableness, in the context of the substance of
the right in a particular case. If circumstances are so degrading as to threaten the lives and basic
well-being of individuals, minimum core obligations are not being met, individuals are found in
situations of crisis, governments bear the duty to undertake immediate action to alleviate
suffering, and courts have an obligation to provide meaningful remedies to vindicate these rights.
These are precisely the types of concerns that warrant heightened Charter scrutiny. In the
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context of the analysis of the rights to life and security of the person under section 7 of the
Charter, this paper suggests that the minimum core approach is relevant in several ways.

A. THE JUSTICIABILITY QUESTION
Canadian courts have a responsibility to ensure that Canadian law develops consistently with the
norms and principles established in international law.171 International human rights law mandates
that States Parties provide a certain substantive, tangible, minimum core of ESR necessary for
survival and basic necessities for life. The CESCR recognizes that there may be circumstances
where even the minimum core content of ESR may be impossible to fulfil, but requires a high
standard of justification from States Parties to the ICESCR if that is the case. States must
demonstrate that they have attempted to use all available resources to meet their minimum
obligations on a priority basis.172
Under international human rights law, the minimum core should not be confused for a
standard of justiciability, which instead derives from the principle that effective remedies must
be provided to all components of ESR, including the requirement to progressively realize those
rights. However, the fact that allegations of infringements of the minimum core require a high
degree of scrutiny into government policy choices and budgetary allocations suggests that access
to courts is indispensable in ensuring that minimum obligations are fulfilled, since judiciaries are
particularly well-positioned to undertake such analyses. States Parties to the ICESCR bear the
obligation of providing access to hearings and meaningful remedies for the violation of ESR,
especially when it comes to matters of necessities for life and basic well-being.
The minimum core may assist courts in distinguishing general matters of socio-economic
policy that are beyond the proper role of courts from those which engage Charter-protected
rights. Courts should not decline to hear ESR-related claims merely out of concern that they will
infringe on the legislature’s policymaking powers by potentially ordering the government to take
positive action to address the deprivation in question. The minimum core can assist courts in
delineating those aspects of ESR that most directly engage Charter-protected interests and values
and provide courts with guidance as to the appropriate standards against which government
policies and programs ought to be assessed. To decline to consider a claim because of a
reluctance to order the provision of tangible goods or to give ESR substance has the consequence
of depriving the rights of any meaningful content—particularly for the most disadvantaged. As
this paper has suggested, courts have a flexible array of options in considering these issues in a
manner respectful of other branches of government. If the minimum core is accepted as an
interpretive tool for the adjudication of ESR-related claims, the focus shifts towards illuminating
the obvious: that the deprivations and hardships faced by society’s most vulnerable and
marginalized are inherently questions of life and security of the person that should attract
Charter scrutiny.
Further, the minimum core may be helpful not only in establishing the justiciability of
ESR, but also in determining which interests and needs connected to socioeconomic deprivations
fall within the proper scope of section 7 of the Charter. If government action or inaction results
directly in individuals freezing on the streets, or dying because they lose access to necessary
health services, these must be recognized as fundamental human rights issues protected by the
Charter. The minimum core refocuses the analysis on the lived realities of some of the most
171
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vulnerable individuals and groups in Canada. The severity of their suffering falls well within the
scope of section 7 and should be accorded significant weight, and only then should the
acceptability of the government’s policy and budgetary choices be assessed in this context.

B. PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE AND SECTION 1
PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
Infringements of section 7 of the Charter are permitted if they are in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice, including the principle of gross disproportionality. A law’s
impact will be grossly disproportionate when it is “so extreme that [it is] per se disproportionate
to any legitimate government interest.”173 Those infringements must further be “demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society” under section 1 of the Charter,174 which the SCC
determined requires a separate proportionality analysis that considers whether the infringements
are rationally connected to a legitimate objective, whether they impair the right as little as
possible, and whether the effects of the measures taken are proportionate to the aims sought.175
If, as in both Canadian Doctors and Tanudjaja, the deprivations in question engage the
minimum core—in other words, survival and basic necessities for life and well-being—it is
difficult to imagine how imposing or enabling these hardships could be proportionate to any
legitimate objective.
Bilchitz argues that proportionality “only works where we have a pre-existing
understanding of the content of particular rights and the weight to be accorded to them.” 176 The
minimum core is essential in establishing this pre-existing understanding. In order to determine
whether a right is minimally impaired, “one needs to have some understanding of the preexisting content of such a fundamental right as otherwise the test will be meaningless: how can
one judge the impact of different measures on a right if one does not know what one is having an
impact upon?”177 Similarly, with respect to the final balancing of effects of the infringements
against the stated aim, Bilchitz states that,
it is only possible to make a judgment as to whether the harms to the right caused by
the limiting measure are proportional to the benefits to be achieved by it if we have
some pre-existing idea as to what the right entails, and how to judge the seriousness
of any violation thereof. The inquiry also requires us to have some understanding of
the “weight” or strength of the interests that are affected.178
It may be the case that sometimes, as in Eldridge,179 the content of Charter rights may be
informed by principles of reasonableness and proportionality. However, there is no question that
the more traditional analysis under the Oakes test works best when the content of the right is
considered separately from the consideration of whether a limitation on the right is reasonable
173
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and demonstrably justifiable. The minimum core may therefore help inform the implementation
of the well-developed proportionality inquiry established in Canadian law. In the case of
homelessness in Canada or denials of access to health care necessary to preserve life, courts need
not engage with more difficult questions of how fully Canada ought to have realized the rights to
housing or health based on its current level of development and available resources. What is at
stake in these cases is the minimum core, the most essential levels of enjoyment of these rights.
In such cases, claimants must have access to courts to seek effective remedies, and courts have a
clear responsibility to demand of governments clear and compelling evidence to justify any
violations of these fundamental rights.

C. GREATER BUDGETARY SCRUTINY UNDER SECTION 1
Hardships and deprivations involving matters concerning the minimum core should attract a
higher degree of scrutiny from courts into the government’s prioritization of budgetary
allocations. The SCC has stated that, while it will look at budgetary considerations as a
justification for rights violations under section 1 of the Charter with great skepticism, “the courts
cannot close their eyes to the periodic occurrence of financial emergencies when measures must
be taken to juggle priorities to see a government through the crisis.”180 In Newfoundland
(Treasury Board) v NAPE, the SCC held that the government of Newfoundland’s legislation to
deny female employees in the health sector pay equity was discriminatory. However, the Court
also held that this discrimination was justified under section 1 as a measure to deal with a fiscal
crisis after deeper scrutiny of evidence provided by the state regarding its budgetary decisions.181
Thus, while violations of the minimum core—or socioeconomic deprivations engaging life and
security of the person—may be justified on the basis of government decisions in setting priorities
and making budgetary allocations, such justifications should be approached with a high degree of
scepticism and subjected to a heightened burden of justification. As Liebenberg stated, a “failure
to ensure … basic social provisioning should only be justifiable when resources are
demonstrably inadequate, or other competing justifications exist.”182 In order to allow courts to
make a proper assessment of the government’s justification, “courts should examine resources
available in the national budget as a whole as opposed to focusing exclusively on existing
allocations.”183 This in turn requires governments to “place the necessary budgetary and policy
information before the court in support of its justificatory arguments.”184
Special attention should be paid to scrutinizing rights-based versus non-rights-based
budgetary allocations. Karin Lehman, for instance, argues that,
[t]he true discontent that informs constitutional adjudication about socio-economic
rights is with the government’s macro-economic policy choices and with the
government’s broad budgetary allocations. It is with the choice of neo-liberal, macroeconomic policies that prioritize growth rather than redistribution, and with the
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government’s decision to spend twice as much on defense than on either the
provision of education and health.185
As Lehman points out, courts “would have little difficulty in finding that a father’s purchase of
the latest BMW is unreasonable if it means that his children are reduced to a diet of bread, water,
and gruel.”186 Another basis of comparison, according to Porter, would be the resource
allocations of other states that have similar levels of development.187

D. CREATING BENCHMARKS FOR THE REALIZATION OF ESR—IN
COURT AND OUTSIDE OF COURT
The above analysis suggested that the minimum core approach, contrary to perceptions that it is
counter-majoritarian and anti-democratic, can actually foster democracy by encouraging a
dialogue between the judiciary, legislature, and relevant stakeholders. This can be accomplished
through implementing a remedy over which the court maintains supervisory jurisdiction, or by
stakeholders working together outside of the courtroom in a participatory manner to establish
priorities, create goals, and set concrete, minimum benchmarks for the realization of ESR.
Wilson and Dugard note that individuals and groups come to the courts when their voices have
been overlooked in the democratic process.188 As such, in adopting a substantive reasonableness
approach that preserves the minimum core, the mere fact of starting the Charter analysis by
ascertaining the needs, interests, and lived realities of individuals and groups affected by severe
socioeconomic deprivations adds a voice to the debate that has been overlooked in the
democratic process as well as by the judiciary when it dismisses a matter for lack of
justiciability.
The CESCR has identified such stakeholder participation as a significant element in
determining whether a government is acting reasonably with respect to the fulfilment of any
particular ESR.189 As the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing has put it, states must
recognize the homeless and the vulnerable as “rights holders resilient in the struggle for survival
and dignity” and “as central agents of the social transformation.”190 While the reasonableness
standard “imposes an obligation on all actors to make decisions consistent with a firm
commitment to the progressive realization of ESR, with access to judicial and effective remedies
and meaningful participation by rights-holders,”191 the minimum core approach highlights the
need to give substantive content to those rights by setting tangible benchmarks for the provision
of concrete resources, in the short- medium- and long-term, to fulfil ESR. The minimum core
also provides a reminder that in setting these benchmarks, the needs of the most vulnerable
should be prioritized.

VI. CONCLUSION
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Though articulating the minimum core is fraught with difficulties, the concept remains an
important reminder to the States Parties to the ICESCR of what is at stake when considering
matters of ESR: deprivation of society’s most vulnerable individuals and groups from the very
resources that are essential to life and basic well-being. Especially in societies like Canada where
the general standard of living is quite high, the state cannot permit these types of deprivations—
let alone be responsible for causing them—and has an obligation to act to alleviate such
hardships. When states fail to fulfil their obligations under international human rights law, courts
have an obligation to provide remedies for ESR violations. States’ obligations under
international human rights law extend to all branches of governments, which all have heightened
obligations to protect and fulfil the minimum core of ESR. The minimum core of ESR and
substantive reasonableness are potentially useful interpretive aids to assess the content of
Charter rights and to order meaningful remedies for their violation in full respect of institutional
boundaries. This paper considered a number of areas where the minimum core could play a role
in the adjudication of ESR in Canada, suggesting that by re-orienting the focus from
preconceived notions of institutional roles or false divisions between civil and political and ESR,
back to the human experience of those who claim their Charter rights in these cases, Canada
might catch up with the rest of the international community in affirming the interdependence,
indivisibility, and justiciability of all human rights.
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